Main causes of Staff labor opportunism in organizations

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Abstract: This article provides an analysis of the reasons for the occurrence of opportunism amongst staff in organizations. Using the results of a staff survey, research was carried out into correlation-regression dependencies of the factors that cause different forms of labor opportunism amongst different categories of workers: managers and their subordinates. On the basis of a quantitative assessment of the level of labor opportunism, the article estimates the inclination towards opportunism in the context of different categories of staff, and ascertains conditions of stability in the occurrence of labor opportunism in the organization. The research conducted into the nature of interference of labor opportunism between managers and subordinates provides evidence that the opportunism of the staff is a response to the opportunism of their superiors.

1. Introduction

The issue of internal regulations and organizational structures of institutions, aimed at preventing and overcoming opportunistic activities amongst their employees (H. Mintzberg 1983), occupies a central position in modern theories of organization. This issue has recently been investigated in the context of the principal - agent relations hierarchy. Despite the fact that these hierarchical relationships are subject to a variety of opportunistic activities, publications in the economic literature have aimed primarily at curbing only one of them: collusion between managers and their subordinates (Vafaı K., 2010). Researchers have analyzed conditions of stability of abuse of power by managers (Vafaı K., 2002) and expediency of conspiracy with subordinates to manipulate information for the purpose of creating personal benefits.[1] The main focus of these studies is limited to a substantiation of effective formal contracts within organizations that would minimize the opportunistic activities of staff.

Opportunism in Russia has a unique national flavor in which social ties are very important. These features are most pronounced in the characteristics of an employment relationship, where there are informal norms and rules (Bodrov O., 2008, 2013). Research conducted in Kazan University (hereinafter KFU) reveals that 44% of the total volume of tasks that staff carry out are not, in their opinion, included in

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[1] For example, Crozier and Friedberg (1977), Edwards (1979), Kofman and Lawarr´ee (1996, p. 118)

their duties and are not tasks for which they are paid extra. In formal contractual relations, managers do not have a right to force workers to perform a task not covered by their contract, and subordinates can refuse to perform these tasks. However, managers successfully use informal methods of coercion, which are not specified in any contract. In this regard, the theory of efficient contracts is an unpromising direction for minimizing labor opportunism in Russia.

In the economic literature, thanks to the work of researchers such as E.V. Popov (2004) and Oliver E. Williamson (1993), an idea has been developed of the essential nature of opportunistic behavior. It relates to any violations of forms of obligations, for example when firms violate contracts during transactions. **Labor opportunism is an intentional hidden infringement by the worker of assumed obligations stipulated by the labor contract.**

The origin of opportunism is an asymmetry of information, which significantly complicates the problems of economic organization. Labor opportunism seldom appears in its explicit forms, such as absenteeism (unauthorized absence from the workplace). More often, opportunism manifests itself in more covert forms. In the economic literature there are descriptions of various forms of opportunistic behavior: adverse selection, «extortion», shirking, «moral risk», carelessness (including knowingly permitting negligence), their different types and combinations. However, most of these occur under conditions in which the collection of reliable information about the behavior of employees involves great expense or is even impossible, and

«only a small part of what people actually do at work amenable to detailed control» (R.R. Nelson, 1981).

Opportunism is a source of «behavioral» uncertainty, causing a lot of problems in the form of explicit and hidden losses. According to the estimates of E.V. Popov (2004), shirking leads to a decrease in performance of 34 % on average, while negligence leads to an average increase in expenses of 27.5 %. In addition, there are significant costs involved in protecting against opportunistic behavior.

The opportunism of employees, however, is closely connected to the opportunism of their managers. This article attempts to identify the nature of that relationship and provides evidence that the opportunism of lecturers at KFU is a defensive reaction to the opportunism of the authorities.

To solve this problem regression models were built on the basis of an analysis of data from a questionnaire completed by faculty members and heads of institutions and departments of the KFU, which enables us to identify the most significant factors leading to labor opportunism for faculty members and leaders separately. The following factors showed the greatest significance:

- lack of incentives (financial or moral) from the leadership of the Institute (faculty) for employees to perform well;

- the level of opportunism of the Institute (faculty) management;

- the level of independence of staff wages from job performance

Using the obtained regression equations, the level of opportunism amongst faculty members and managers was calculated, and the degree of stability of "opportunistic traps" in KFU was assessed.

The results have been used to develop programs to minimize labor opportunism in the KFU.

2. Material and Methods

To investigate the level of opportunism in Kazan (Volga) Federal University (hereafter KFU) a survey method was used. Two types of questionnaires were developed: the first a questionnaire for the assessment of the opportunism of employees, and the second for managers of the University.

The questionnaires included 31 questions that investigate different factors in the emergence and manifestation of labor opportunism in the University. The factors were identified through interviewing faculty members from various institutions within KFU, and divided into 5 aggregate groups: organizational (transaction), communication, demotivating, tangible and intangible. The results of the questionnaires were processed using a least-squares regression analysis method (OLS).

To enable a quantitative analysis of the questionnaires, the Harrington verbal / numeric scale was applied; a method that is widely and effectively used in practice for solving various tasks with expert methods.[2]

A scattered quota sample was used for the purposes of the research. 787 faculty members from across the institutes and faculties of KFU, aged between 22 and 65 years, took part in the survey, along with 47 managers from different levels, giving a total of 834 persons.

The general population as measured by the number of staff in KFU on 1 November 2013 was 2539 people (information from the personnel Department). The results of the questionnaires were processed using a least-squares regression analysis method (OLS).

3. Results

The analysis of opportunism amongst faculty members in KFU was conducted on the basis of regression model 1, the results of which are presented in table 1:

Table 1, Model 1:OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X23- Level of staff opportunism

	Coefficient	Std. error	t-statistic	P-value	
X4	0,0644142	0,0232971	2,7649	0,00583	***
X9	-0,0733331	0,030262	-2,4233	0,01561	**
X11_1	0,0488386	0,0178208	2,7405	0,00628	***
X11_2	0,19482	0,0426895	4,5637	<0,00001	***
X11_3	0,112399	0,0429122	2,6193	0,00898	***
X12_1	0,0812173	0,0350971	2,3141	0,02093	**
X20	0,0791411	0,0320606	2,4685	0,01378	**
X21_1	-0,0927578	0,0349348	-2,6552	0,00809	***
X21_3	0,118412	0,0412725	2,8690	0,00423	***
X22_1	0,429239	0,0309802	13,8552	<0,00001	***
X24	0,138223	0,0355985	3,8828	0,00011	***
X25	0,225165	0,0357831	6,2925	<0,00001	***
X27	-0,0968035	0,0410502	-2,3582	0,01861	**
X28	-0,105877	0,0348344	-3,0395	0,00245	***

Table 2, Qualitative characteristics of the model 1

The mean of the dependent variable	0,280280	The standard deviation of the dependent variable	0,241717
The sum of the square of residuals	22,54458	Std error of the model	0,170888
R-squared	0,790765	Corrected R-squared	0,786971
F(15, 772)	194,5087	P- value (F)	4,7e-250
LLR	281,2961	AIC	-532,5922
SC	-462,5688	HQ	-505,6716

To interpret the degree of impact of the revealed factors on the level of opportunism of faculty

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[2] See: Glotov V.A., Pavel'ev V.V. Vector stratification. -M: Nauka, 1984.

members, coefficients of elasticity were calculated according to the formula:

$$E_i = b_i \frac{\overline{X}_i}{\overline{Y}}$$　　　　　(1),

where *bi* is a regression coefficient, Ei is a average value of elasticity of factor X_i and x̄i is the average value of indicator Xi in questionnaires.

From the total of 31 factors the following were selected by a process of regression analysis of the most significant characteristics of the model (with minimum values of the errors on indicators P-value (F)) and the maximum value of the coefficients of elasticity, reflecting the degree of their influence on the level of labor opportunism among staff (X23) (see table 3).

Table 3, Factors influencing the opportunism of faculty members

Variables	Variable names	Elasticity
X22_1	Level of opportunism amongst management of the Faculty	0,61
X25	Level of social support given by the management of KFU to the staff	0,47
X11_2	Level of trust offered by the staff to the management of the Faculty	0,29
X24	The level of support offered by the leadership of the Faculty to employees for improvement of Department, Institute (faculty), or KFU activities.	0,24
X28	Level of positive changes in Your Faculty	0,20
X27	Level of social justice in KFU	0,19
X21_1	Efficiency and rationality of the actions of the management of KFU	0,15
X12_1	Level of trust offered by management to the KFU staff	0,14
X21_3	Efficiency and rationality of actions of the management of the Department	0,13
X11_3	Level of trust offered by faculty members to the management of Department	0,12
X11_1	Level of trust offered by faculty members to the management of KFU	0,09
X20	Satisfaction with the relationship between employees and management	0,09
X9	The handing over the job of the Department or Faculty management to their subordinates	0,081

The elasticity ratio indicator X22_1 equals 0,61, which means that for a reduction of 1% in the level of Faculty management opportunism, the level of opportunism of faculty members will be reduced by 0.61%.

The second degree of significance is the level of social support given to faculty members by the management of KFU (the elasticity coefficient is 0.47). Social support in the context of this research includes not only financial assistance to faculty members, but also changes to the style of relationship of managers to subordinates. The academic environment is very sensitive to any form of neglect of opinions, where faculty members are not considered and they have to work in conditions of increasing academic restrictions.

Following (by a substantial gap) these two, the next indicator is the level of trust in the management of the faculty amongst staff (with a coefficient of elasticity of 0,29), meaning that the level of opportunism of faculty members depends on this indicator by almost one third. The level of trust, however, is not estimated in the current state of development of KFU. The first symptom of distrust in KFU is the concealment of information for fear that others may use it to cause harm. Faculty members and more managers are afraid to show weaknesses in their professional activities, because they are convinced that nobody will help them, and that it is likely that they will be subjected to various kinds of penalties.

The hiding of information in KFU appears at different levels. Ordinary faculty members rarely receive complete information discussed at meetings of the scientific Councils of the structural divisions and the scientific Council of KFU, at the meetings of the Administration and the relevant Committee of the Academic Council of KFU. This leads to serious consequences in the form of wave effects of asymmetric information. The majority of faculty members are unaware of professional development opportunities which have recently become available thanks to the efforts of KFU.

This situation leads to a strengthening of the multi-vector orientation of interests and objectives of faculty members and management that is another distinctive form of mistrust in the social environment of KFU. Faculty members do not perceive the development goals of KFU faculty members as their own.

This conclusion is supported by the indicator of impact on opportunism provided by the level of support offered by employees to the Faculties management for improvement of departmental, faculty, or KFU activities (with an elasticity ratio of 0.24). The average value of this indicator according to the questionnaires is 0.47; this means that almost half of the proposals of the workers are ignored by the leaders of various levels. Managers are therefore implying: «Your suggestions are not necessary to us! That distracts us from the work! ». This approach aggravates the problem of distrust in managers even further. However, the results of the calculations

carried out have proved that a change of 1% in the degree of attention to the faculty members in this matter can lead to a decrease in the level of labor opportunism of 0.24%.

Another problem is that Vafai Korch (Vafai.K. 2002) identifies the abuse of power as very important in KFU and something that has a significant impact on the level of opportunism of faculty members, who are quite seriously dissatisfied with their relationships with their direct managers, as confirmed by the data analysis presented in model 2:

Table 4, Model 2:OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X23-Level of the staff's opportunism

	Coefficient	Std error	t-statistic	P-value	
X2	0,13444	0,0371641	3,6175	0,00032	***
X3	0,163901	0,0398959	4,1082	0,00004	***
X4	-0,22561	0,0202885	11,1201	<0,00001	***

Table 5, Qualitative characteristics of the model 2

The mean of the dependent variable	0,274562	The standard deviation of the dependent variable	0,17353
The sum of the square of residuals	26,64437	Std error of the model	0,18435
R-squared	0,678974	Corrected R-squared	0,67815
F(3, 784)	552,7238	P- value (F)	6,8e-193
LLR	215,5488	AIC	-425,097
SC	-411,0929	HQ	-419,713

Table 6, Value of the elasticity of the model 2

Variables	Variable names	Elasticity
X2	Degree of regularity when faculty members require to perform work, not relevant to official duties	0,20529
X3	The load level of the work (the tasks of management), not included in the duties	0,26308
X4	Satisfaction of job	0,471418

Faculty members amplify their labor opportunism when confronted with cases of coercion by managers to do work outside their official duties. According to the results of the survey, this practice is commonplace (the degree of regularity is 42%). The faculty members noted that of the total volume of their work, 44% comprises tasks which, in their opinion, are not part of their job responsibilities. These two factors increase the level of the staff opportunism by 0.21% and 0.26% for each percentage point increase in their values respectively. Moreover, they negatively influence the level of job satisfaction of faculty members, which is quite important for reducing the level of opportunism. So, by increasing staff satisfaction from work by 1% it is possible to reduce the level of opportunism by 0.47%. Now, the average value of this indicator amounts to 43%, even less than 50%!

Analysis of motivational factors.

The results of the research demonstrate that it is not the absolute level of wages which has a significant impact on the level of staff opportunism (although this figure is very important); rather it is the absence of a link between the wage level and:
- parameters of intensity and quality of the work
- performance indicators of labor.

Workers are convinced that working harder will not be reflected in the value of their wages.

This dependence is confirmed by the following parameters of the model 3:

Table 7, Model 3: OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X23-Level of the staff's opportunism

	Coefficient	Std error	t-statistic	P-value	
X14	-0,259542	0,0225221	11,5239	<0,00001	***
X13	-0,192342	0,0234439	8,2043	<0,00001	***

Table 8, Qualitative characteristics of the model 7

The mean of the dependent variable	0,274562	The standard deviation of the dependent variable	0,173536
The sum of the square of residuals	31,00430	Std error of the model	0,198736
R-squared	0,626443	Corrected R-squared	0,625968
F(3, 784)	658,2110	P- value (F)	1,4e-168
LLR	155,9147	AIC	307,8293
SC	-298,4929	HQ	304,2399

Table 9, Motivational factors of opportunism

Variables	Variable names	Elasticity
X14	The dependence of the size of wages on results of work effort (will work more - will paid better)	0,5078
X13	the degree of conformity of payment of labor intensity and the quality of work	0,34978

The elasticity values obtained for motivational factors X14 and X13 show that for each 1% increase in the association of the wage level of workers with the results of their efforts, the level of their labor opportunism reduced by 0.51%. If the connection between faculty members' wages and the intensity and quality of their work, rather than their formal position, is increased by 1%, their level of opportunism decreases by 0.35% .

The most important motivational factor linked to labor opportunism, and one that is undervalued at present by the heads of various departments and faculties of KFU, is to encourage faculty members for a job done well. Currently, managers at different levels are of the opinion that every teacher has to work well and that this is not a criterion for reward. This is appropriate if the difference in labor performance is reflected in the level of wages. However, when payment does not depend on performance, but is instead tied to their position, the promotion of efficient workers is a signal to everyone that management appreciates high productivity.

At present, there is a system in which faculty members have no idea who else received a performance bonus and why. Moreover, they themselves sometimes do not know why they received a different sum of money in their bank account compared to their expected monthly income. Worst of all is the fact that they receive bonuses and other types of rewards, but the absence of public information about them precludes them from being used as a motivational mechanism in full. Meanwhile, according to the calculations in model 4 below (X15 in, Table 10,12) a 1% increase in regularity of employees' rewards for a good job leads to a decrease in the level of their opportunism of 0,75%. The estimated elasticity for this indicator of 0.75 elevates it to the rank of the most influential factor in determining faculty members' labor opportunism.

Table 10, Model 4: OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X23-Level of the staff's opportunism

	Coefficient	Std error	t-statistic	P-value	
X15	0,329359	0,0178266	18,4757	<0,00001	***
X16	0,0834086	0,0159768	5,2206	<0,00001	***

Table 11, Qualitative characteristics of the model 4

The mean of the dependent variable	0,274562	The standard deviation of the dependent variable	0,173536
The sum of the square of residuals	25,06498	Std error of the model	0,178689
R-squared	0,698004	Corrected R-squared	0,697619
F(3, 784)	907,1844	P- value (F)	8,0e-205
LLR	239,5942	AIC	-475,1883
SC	-465,8519	HQ	-471,5989

Table 12, Motivational factors of opportunism

Variables	Variable names	Elasticity
X15	Encouraging the Faculty by the Management (financially or morally) for a good job	0,75033
X16	The degree of involvement in management processes	0,19138

This analysis showed that the intangible forms of public encouragement of employees are not practically applied at the level of departments and faculties, although their degree of impact on the labor activity of faculty members takes second place after tangible factors. This conclusion is confirmed by the data in Table 13, which shows the results obtained from the survey:

As can be seen from the data presented in table 15, the most significant factor that increases the level of faculty member's opportunism is excessive control by the head of the Department of process and the results of the performed works. Currently, the

average degree of control of the faculty members in KFU is 61%. This is a normal level, but it is important to note that this is an average. In individual structural units it is over 80%, and employees perceive such a level of control as an expression of distrust of their subordinates by the management.

Table 13, The rating of influence factors on labor activity

Variant	Factors	Rank
X18,1	financial incentives	**1**
X18,2	public moral stimulation	**2**
X18,6	the labor spirit of the collective	**3**
X18,3	economic sanctions	**4**
X18,4	administrative measures (fines)	**5**
X18,7	adversarial elements	**6**
X18,5	fear of losing a job	**7**

Table 14, **Type of managers behavior**
Model 5: OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X23-Level of the staff's opportunism

	Coefficient	Std error	t-statistic	P-value	
X5	0,101083	0,0396216	2,5512	0,01092	**
X7	0,227265	0,0183617	12,3772	<0,00001	***
X8	0,189485	0,0417015	4,5438	<0,00001	***
X10	0,204477	0,0411952	4,9636	<0,00001	***

Factors relating to management behaviors that influence staff opportunism are shown in table 15:

Table 15, Factors relating to management behaviors

Variables	Variable names	Elasticity
X7	Degree of the control by the head of the Department of the process and results of the work	0,50039
X8	Cases of unfair treatment of manager of the Department or Faculty to the subordinated	0,17817
X10	Conscious downplaying the results of the work of certain employees of the Department or Faculty management	0,17794

It is fair to note that less control may also lead to opportunism, for example if subordinates are left to themselves. It is therefore necessary to find an optimal balance.

The results of the analysis show that changes in the level of the managers ' control over the processes and results of the performed works of subordinates by 1% can change the level of staff opportunism by 0.5%.

Factors involving unfair attitudes of the administration of a Department or Faculty towards their subordinates were identified: belittling of the results of the work of certain employees and unjustified exaltation of others. The degree of influence of these on the level of opportunism is

almost the same: 0,18% for each percentage point change in these factors.

As a result of the regression analysis of the data contained in the questionnaires completed by faculty members, the identified indicators were ranked according to the degree of their influence on the faculty members' labor opportunism as summarized in table 16.

Table 16, The rating of influence factors on staff's labor opportunism

Rank	The name of index	Elasticity
1	Encouragement by the Faculty management (financially or morally) of good jobs carried out by employees	0,75
2	The level of opportunism of the management	0,61
3	The independence of the wage from the results of work effort (will work more - will paid better)	0,51
4	A degree of control by the head of the Department a process and results of the performed works	0,50
5	Satisfaction of the job	0,47
6	The level of social support of employees of the KFUs management	0,47
7	The discrepancy of wages intensity and quality of work	0,35
8	The level of faculty members trust to the Faculties management	0,29
9	To do the work not included in duties of employee	0,26
10	The level of support of the Faculties Management employees offers on improvement of the activity of KFUs Department, Faculty	0,24
11	The level of positive changes in Your Faculty	0,20
12	The degree of participation in management processes	0,19
13	The unfair attitude of the Departments management to the subordinated	0,18

We can see from the data in table 16 that the greatest influences on the level of employee opportunism were the factors of lack of recognition and encouragement by the managers of departments and faculties of work done well. Faculty members consider it inevitable that some form of penalties will apply for omissions in their work. But it is necessary to maintain a balance: the same inevitability must be present in the form of rewards for success in work.

The second most important factor of teachers' labor opportunism was the level of opportunism amongst faculty management. For the head, a situation involving «fuzzy» duties assigned to workers is very convenient, because in this situation they have an opportunity to abuse their power. A manager is able to dictate the type of work and level of workload of subordinates on his own. In this case, the head may wish to offload one-off fixed-term orders and jobs onto employees who are able to do them without complaint and with high quality. The

staff who in one form or another demonstrate their discontent (sometimes in form of open aggression), or try to shift jobs to someone else, are, as a rule, avoided. A manager is not going to test the resistance of these subordinates every time, so he minimizes his own stress and offloads additional unpaid work onto employees, who are ready to do the extra work.

In this way a situation appears in which workers are overworked, but not able to dedicate their full attention to the official duties for which they receive a salary. Employees are not paid more or motivated to do extra work, therefore they perceive it as an additional burden and execute it poorly. This contributes to a situation in KFU of independence of wages from the results of work effort - the third most important factor in the faculty members' labor opportunism.

Faculty member's opportunism as a defensive response

Analysis of the causes of faculties management opportunism in institutions conducted according to a survey of faculty members showed that the main factor of faculty members opportunism is the indicator X23, (see Model 6, table 17) with a regression coefficient of 0,44594 and an elasticity coefficient of 0,32.

Table 17, Model 6: OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X22_1-Level of the faculty managements opportunism

	Coefficient	Std. error	t-statistic	P-value	
X9	0,179059	0,0298999	5,9886	<0,00001	***
X21_2	0,197302	0,0464749	4,2453	0,00002	***
X24	0,274888	0,0346768	7,9272	<0,00001	***
X25	0,13424	0,0368568	3,6422	0,00029	***
X27	-0,117752	0,0409235	-2,8774	0,00412	***
X23	0,44594	0,0321707	13,8617	<0,00001	***

Given that one of the relevant factors in the opportunism of faculty members is faculty management opportunism (see table 17), the finding identified in model 6 indicates the existence of closely interdependent links between faculty members opportunism and their managers. If we take into account the results of the analysis of the reasons for opportunism amongst the workers, it can be assumed that they were the consequence of a response to the opportunism of heads of structural subdivisions of KFU.

To test this assumption, the closeness of ties between the opportunism of the faculty members and their managers was analyzed, which resulted in the identification of a significant relationship.

For greater reliability the respective regression models were constructed according to a survey of both - faculty members and managers - heads of departments, deans of faculties. The following results are obtained.

1. The opportunism of the faculty members is significantly influenced by the opportunism of Institute Directors (deans) (the regression coefficient is 0.53, elasticity - 0.75). The share of influence of opportunism amongst heads of departments proved insignificant (the regression coefficient is 0, so heads of departments were excluded from further analysis.

2. Using elasticity coefficients, the opportunistic reactions of faculty members and heads to the demonstration of opportunism by each of the parties were calculated. Workers in their assessments estimated a lower likely opportunistic response to the opportunism of the managers and also a lower estimate of the reaction of the authorities to their own opportunism.

Managers in their assessments overestimated the opportunist reaction of their subordinates, and overstated their own. Thus, each of the parties unanimously overestimated management's opportunistic response in relation to subordinates. From the ratio of the excess data it can be estimated which party is more inclined to opportunistic behavior; the results of the calculations are given in table18:

Table 18, Score of propensity to opportunism

Estimation	Reaction (coefficients of elasticity)		The propensity to engage in opportunistic behavior	
	faculty members	managers	faculty members (gr2-gr3):rp3	managers (gr3-gr2):gr2
1	2	3	4	5
faculty members	0,75	0,84	-0.107	-
managers	0,81	0,91	-	0,124

As can we see from the estimates given in the table 18, faculty members have a negative tendency towards opportunism. This means that they are not the initiators of opportunistic behavior; their role is passive, subservient.

Heads of institutions (faculties) are more than 2.16 times more likely to behave opportunistically (even according to their own estimates) than their subordinates. This is a natural consequence of hierarchical power, which enables them to establish rules to their own advantage. For this reason, the opportunism of the heads is a heavy burden on faculty members.

Faculty members in turn strengthen their forms of labor opportunism. The process may take the form of self-reinforcing tendencies resulting in an opportunistic trap.

In both cases, opportunism occurs as a result of violation of the equilibrium of conformity in labor relations. In a formalized form the condition of stability of opportunistic equilibrium can be represented as the following dependence:

$$\frac{OpM}{OpFM} = 1 \rightarrow min \tag{2}$$

here
- OpM is an opportunism level of the heads of institutions (faculties)
-       OpFM is the opportunism level of faculty members.

Minimization of the level of opportunism is in the interest of both parties, as both parties suffer from its presence, so this dependence is oriented to a minimum. However, the condition of equality in the level of opportunism can be under rather high values.

To quantify the level of opportunism of KFUs faculty members can be obtained in the result of analysis in model 1 (table 1) coefficients of the regression, which are used by building a regression equation:

Y=0,064X4+0,07X9+0,05X11_1+0,2X11_2+0, 1124X11_3+0,081X12_1+ +0,079X20 -0,093321_1+ 0,12X21_3 +0,43X22_1+0,14X24 + 0,225X25 - 0,097X27 -0,106X28   (3)

Substituting the average values of relevant variables into this equation, the average level of opportunism of KFUs faculty members was calculated as:

Y = 0,581

This figure suggests that, ideally, the productivity of faculty members could be increased by 58.1 % if the influence of the identified factors of their opportunism could be neutralized.

Managers opportunism

To identify the reasons and factors determining the manager's opportunism at different levels, a regression analysis was carried out on the data obtained from the questionnaire survey of faculty members. The results are presented in the form of model 7 (table 19).

Table 19, Model 7: OLS, used observations 1-787
Dependent variable: X22_1-Opportunism of the Faculties management (Regression analysis of the results of the faculty members' survey)

	Coefficient	Std. error	t-statistic	P-value	
X9	0,179059	0,0298999	5,9886	<0,00001	***
X21_2	0,197302	0,0464749	4,2453	0,00002	***
X24	0,274888	0,0346768	7,9272	<0,00001	***
X25	0,13424	0,0368568	3,6422	0,00029	***
X27	-0,117752	0,0409235	-2,8774	0,00412	***
X23	0,44594	0,0321707	13,8617	<0,00001	***

According to the results of analysis of the regression
coefficients a regression equation of leaders' opportunism was constructed:

YM = 0,18X9 + 0, 2X21_2 + 0,28X24 + 0,13X 25-0,12X27+0,45X23 (4)

Substituting the average values of relevant variables into this equation, the average quantitative assessment of opportunism level of KFUs Faculties heads was calculated:

YM= 0,18*0,3 + 0,2*0,39+ 0,280,47 + 0,13*0,57-0,12*0,53+0,45*0,27456 = 0,40

This means that, in the opinion of employees, 40% of the KFUs managers' activity is opportunistic in nature, i.e. 40% of managers labor activity is spent unproductively. In this assessment the manifestations of managers' opportunism faced by their subordinates are taken into account.

The results of the regression analysis were identified and ranked the factors affecting the opportunism of managers. Results of the analysis are given in the table 20.

Table 20, Factors of managers opportunism

Rank	The name of index	Elasticity
1	The level of support offered by employees to the Faculties Management in improvement of KFU's Department, Faculty, or University activities	0,34
2	The level of opportunism of teacher	0,33
3	The efficiency and rationality of the Faculties managers in the eyes of subordinates	0,20
4	The level of social support of employees of the KFUs management	0,19
5	The level of social justice in KFU	0,16
6	Managers of the Institute (faculty) shifts their work on subordinates	0,14

The most influential of these factors was the level of support of the Faculties Management employees offer towards improvement of KFU activities. The value of the coefficient of elasticity of this indicator is 0.34.

From the correlation of the parties' opportunism levels by the formula (2) the stability of opportunistic equilibrium in KFU was calculated:

$$\frac{\text{OpM}}{\text{OpFM}} = \frac{0,40}{0,581} = 0,69$$

This means when the coefficient of opportunistic equilibrium goes to 1 and there is an identified increased tendency to opportunism of the heads of institutions (faculties) in the near future, we have to expect further strengthening of the level of opportunism of managers, so that the value of the fraction could be closer to 1.

Based on this analysis, a reduction in opportunism amongst faculty members seems unlikely because in KFU an "opportunistic trap" has been established. Administrative measures taken without consideration of the teachers' opinions, and often contrary to them, makes them all the more indignant, starting the "flywheel" of their opportunism.

This conclusion is confirmed by regression analysis of the results of the survey of managers. To evaluate the degree of influence of the style of management on teachers' opportunism, regression model 8M was built, shown in table. 21:

Table 21. Model 8M: OLS, used observations 1-47
Dependent variable: X25-Level of the staff's opportunism

	Coefficient	Std. error	t-statistic	P-value	
X7	0,753949	0,0664818	11,3407	<0,00001	***

Here X7 is the style of management established in KFU. According to a survey of managers of faculties and heads of departments, the average value of this index in KFU is 0,447 on a Harrington scale, which corresponds to a "sympathetic" authoritarian style of management. The coefficient of elasticity of this factor is 0,87512, meaning that when the sty le of management in KFU changes by 1%, the level of faculty members' opportunism may change by 0,875% (in one direction or the other). This is the most significant factor in terms of impact on labor opportunism.

4. Discussions

1. This analysis has allowed us to identify the current level of staff opportunism in KFU. The average opportunism is 58% of faculty members and 40% of the heads of faculties.

2. Faculty members' opportunism is a response to the opportunism of their heads, while at the same time the heads of divisions are more prone to engage in opportunistic behavior (even according to their own estimates) than their subordinates.

3. Results of the cross-analysis of the reasons for labor opportunism testify to the homogeneity of the reasons of occurrence of opportunistic behavior of faculty members and their managers, evidenced by common factors found in the analysis of faculty members and faculty managers. These include:

- Style of personnel management.
- Level of mutual opportunism of faculty members and faculty managers.
- Low level of involvement of staff in management processes.
- Lack of support for the faculties' leadership employee's offers on improvement of the activity of department, faculty, KFU.
- Level of social justice and social support for faculty members from the leadership of KFU.

- Execution of extra work (management tasks) that is not relevant to official duties.- Low intensity of public incentives (material or moral) for work well done.

- Mismatch (independence) of the wages with intensity and quality of the work.

Among the significant factors mentioned above which contribute to the current level of teacher's opportunism, the determining factor is the management style, because all the following factors, in varying degrees, are derived from this.

The management style must change, since the external and internal environment of KFU is continuously changing. Neglect of this inevitably leads to a conflict between KFU's aims and methods of achieving them. It is difficult to demand creativity and scientific effectiveness from faculty members through manipulation.

A way out of the problem is the creation of the training system for the management; it is necessary to teach them modern personnel management techniques, based on mutual trust. At present the level of subordinates' trust in the management of KFU faculties is about 59%, and trust in KFUs management is 48%, according to the survey of faculty members. The average level of the management's trust in subordinates is lower than 52%. According to Patrick Lencioni (2011), an effective team cannot be formed under conditions of low or average levels of trust. Trust cannot occur suddenly by order of management. The building of trust is an ongoing, systematic process in which managers require support.

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7/5/2014